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THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING
A SPACELAB PROGRAM

Joseph Fuller, Jr.

ABSTRACT
The Spacelab concept of providing standard, reusable accom
modations for Orbiter-attached payloads has the promise of
yielding highly rewarding research. Although NASA expe
rience with aircraft, sounding rockets, Skylab and free flyers
can be applied to Spacelab payload management, new and
innovative management approaches must be tailored to meet
unique Spacelab and STS requirements.
This paper will discuss from a Spacelab Payload Manager's
perspective the major management challenges which must
be successfully overcome if payload programs are to not only
exist but thrive. Specific management strategies for meeting
these challenges will also be discussed.

build. This assessment would be incomplete if it failed to
mention the pervasive twin economic pressures of scarce
funding and manpower whose effects often dictate compro
mise.
This paper will specifically address the Project's role in devel
oping payloads which take advantage of STS capabilities
and in establishing an efficient process for executing Spacelab missions. The major challenge facing the Project is how
best to make use of the unique STS capability to do cost
effective scientific and applications research. A key element
in meeting this challenge is insuring that the uses for the
Spacelab are appropriate to its unique capabilities.

SPACELAB UTILIZATION

INTRODUCTION
A little more than a year and a half ago, I enthusiastically
accepted an offer to lead Goddard Space Flight Center's
Shuttle Spacelab Payloads Project (SSPP). The Project was
charged with establishing a capability to effectively utilize
the Spacelab element of the Space Transportation System
(STS). Although there were problems to overcome, the
prospects of influencing the shape of the new STS were
exciting and challenging. But, because of the problems,
there was little doubt: For the STS to be successful, some
innovative changes would be necessary.
Why is change necessary? First, space research capabilities,
as represented by the Shuttle/STS, are expanding and becom
ing increasingly sophisticated in their use. Forty to sixty
Shuttle launches per year, by itself, will require a different
approach to STS operations. Second, NASA has a reputa
tion for excellence in accomplishing its objectives. This
tradition is too strong to permit failure; therefore, we will-
no we must adapt to this new environment and its problems.
Third, NASA as an organization has more than 20 years
experience in developing and integrating space flight systems.
At the Goddard Space Flight Center, this means that we have
repeated the basic process more than 140 times on space
craft and 1,500 times on individual instruments. Similar, but
somewhat different, experience could be recounted by other
NASA Centers. It is from this foundation that we must

WHAT IS SPACELAB?
Perhaps it is best to begin by defining Spacelab. The Spacelab, when combined with the Orbiter, is a standard, reusable
spacecraft for accommodating attached payloads requiring
7-30 day orbital stay times. When man is added to this
complement, Spacelab represents a unique and extremely
versatile platform for spaceborne research. Some of the more
valuable uses of Spacelab are:
A. Free-flyer substitute-for technical or economic
reasons, a free-flying spacecraft may not be compatible with
a user's requirements. In some cases, until the technology
advances to the point where a free-flyer becomes feasible and
economical, Spacelab may indeed be the only alternative for
conducting spaceborne research. Examples are large payloads
for which a unique spacecraft would be clearly uneconomical,
or instruments whose sensor technology does not readily
permit a free-flyer solution such as the large cryogenically
cooled Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF), or an
experiment which requires high power consumption such as
material processing furnaces and active laser sensors.
B. Human Interaction-although, in some cases, robots
and other computer controlled machines have proven to be
valuable, they can also be extremely expensive or poor sub-
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stitutes when on-the-spot judgments are necessary. The
human being as a subject for life sciences experiments should
also be included in this category. Discriminating use of
human interactive capability can significantly enhance the
results of certain investigations.

PROGRAM GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Research program goals and objectives for Spacelab can only
be determined by relating research or science interests, in
terms of performance requirements, to the capabilities offer
ed by the Spacelab. But, because of the growing number of
alternative space research platforms (aircraft, balloons,
sounding rockets, Spacelab, Explorers, Multi-mission space
craft, unique observatory spacecraft, and possible in the near
future, large space platforms), deciding which interests to
pursue with Spacelab cannot be made in isolation. The
attributes of these alternative approaches and how well they
could satisfy the desired performance requirements must be
assessed. One can imagine a decision tree type of analysis
where, for each science interest, explicit performance re
quirements can be obtained, then assessed against the capa
bilities of Spacelab and the other alternatives. Ultimately,
the development of explicit criteria for optimal uses of
Spacelab, as well as other platforms, would result. A major
benefit could be a more efficient process for use by the
research community and NASA for determining the allo
cation of scarce resources among competing alternatives.

C. Payload Reflights-in this category, planned payload
changes between flights are required to accomplish mission
or investigation objectives. This capability is often incom
patible or uneconomical with free-flying spacecraft. Ex
amples are specialized multiuser facilities such as the Solar
Optical Telescope and the SI RTF which, through their
allowance for changes in focal plane instrumentation, permit
science missions to evolve in response to the state of current
knowledge. Furthermore* the basic facility itself can be
improved and refined in an evolutionary manner. Another
example is a calibration program interspersed between flights
to assure the integrity of very precise measurements. Also,
the payload return capability inherent in this category should
not be overlooked. It provides a very valuable Spacelab
service, the use and return of photographic film.
D. Test Bed—this capability provides a true-to-life
space laboratory environment with which to resolve tech
nological and operational uncertainties or questions. Know
ledge obtained through this process may be used to design a
permanent Spacelab or free-flyer component, instrument or
facility. Sometimes this method may be used to successfully
demonstrate a technique before committing to an operation
al system.

MISSION DEVELOPMENT
Once Spacelab program goals and objectives have been
established, the next step is to solicit investigations (exper
iments), payloads, and missions which contribute to the
major program thrusts. Ideally, only those proposals which
exploit Spacelab capabilities, contribute to the solution of
major research problems or new discoveries, and are accepted
as a worthwhile undertaking by researchers and management
alike, should be selected for implementation. It would also
be most helpful if there is a compelling reason to complete
the mission sooner rather than later. If this part of the pro
cess is carried out properly, what will have been accom
plished is the identification of compelling and urgent reasons
for Spacelab missions. Most planned human endeavors of
any consequence, including space missions, possess these
characteristics.

Thus far, atmospheric and space plasmas, physics, life sci
ences, and materials processing are research disciplines which
appear to have made the best use of Spacelab's unique
capabilities. In general, the mature Spacelab ground and
flight system should provide a means for satisfying require
ments for a rapid response to changing space research prob
lems. For some uses, a significant question persists: Is the
present constraint of 7 to 30 days for a Spacelab mission
worth the cost? The discussion immediately following will
describe an approach for determining the most appropriate
uses for Spacelab.

CRITICAL CHOICES
REFINING THE PROCESS
Although you now have an idea of how Spacelab could be
used, successfully determining the most appropriate uses for
Spacelab will depend on: (1) The pursuit of program goals
and objectives uniquely, or at least, optimally suited to the
Spacelab capabilities such as those described previously,
(2) The identification of high priority Spacelab investi
gations, payloads and missions, and (3) A critical assessment
and feedback of experiences from early Spacelab missions.
All of the above must be decided in a world of ever increas
ing space capabilities and operational alternatives. What
follows is a simplified examination of how these critical
choices might be made.

It should not be forgotten that Spacelab, being a fairly new
concept, is itself an experiment. Therefore, many of the
assumptions that will have to be made regarding its operation
will naturally involve varying degrees of uncertainty. It
follows then that we must be especially vigilant in verifying
these assumptions under flight conditions. Such vigilance
will only serve to refine the process of assuring the most
appropriate and effective future uses of Spacelab.
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SPACELAB PAYLOAD
MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
THE CHALLENGE
One of the greatest challenges facing NASA is the challenge
of bringing into reality the expanded technical capabilities,
cost and operational advantages that have long been claimed
for the STS concept. Some of these capabilities such as
added mass and volume and payload retrieval and return
have already been designed into the STS and will be rel
atively easy to achieve. A somewhat more difficult chal
lenge is the goal of simple, low-cost, routine and more fre
quent access to space. This is basically the challenge accepted
by our Project: Establishing a simple, efficient system for
Spacelab payload development, integration and operations.
AN ASSESSMENT
Before establishing such a system, the Project gave consider
able attention to what the operational STS era would be like.
The answer: (1) Increased interfaces as a result of the many
separate elements making up a single mission (instruments,
flight support equipment, Spacelab, and orbiter); (2) Large
volume operations-volume because of its multidimensional
aspect such as high launch rate and payload complexity;
(3) Standard spacecraft bus and payload interfaces with
numerous expanded capabilities; (4) Considerable payload
integration experience resides in both government and in
dustry (no new technology); (5) Technological challenges
are in the development of new instrumentation; (6) Ground
and flight systems must be able to handle the future missions
whose engineering and operational requirements are un
known and are continuously evolving. It was from assess
ments such as these that the Project's implementation
strategies and approaches have evolved, and are continuously
evolving.

agement functions, as well as, "hard" systems such as the
hands-on hardware integration functions. For the production
principle to pay-off, almost as much attention will have to
be paid to the process as is presently paid to the product.
The efficiencies inherent in these production-like Spacelab
processes should be exploited for their obvious cost savings.
B. Autonomy--Because of the large number of interfaces
and organizations (Headquarters Office of Space Science and
Office of Space Transportation System, Johnson Space
Center, Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center,
Goddard Space Flight Center Principal Investigator Insti
tutions, and contractors) required to execute a Spacelab
mission, it is vitally important that interdependence be
minimized. In other words, the maximum autonomy that is
reasonably possible must be promoted for not only instru' ment, payload and STS mission elements; but also Head
quarters, Centers and Project organizations. Unless organiza
tional entities are able to fulfill their obligations according to
comprehensive standardized interface agreements, with only
a reasonable amount of special interaction, much of the
promise of the STS, such as frequent, uncomplicated access
to space may never be realized. The system could easily fail to
operate as a result of its internally generated encumbrances.
At Goddard, some of our more promising strategies for
achieving Spacelab objectives are based on this principle of
maximizing autonomy. The development of instruments
without mission assignment frees the developer from the
pressure of mission schedules. The use of performance ori
ented end-item contracts delegates more responsibility and,
hence, more independence to contractors to manage their
internal resources. The development of policy guidelines
and procedures early in a program allows operating de
cisions to be made more rapidly and at a lower level. Also,
the project plans to give special attention to engineering and
operational interfaces to minimize their impact on the in
tegration process. And, of course, the success of our prin
ciple regarding production-line processes is dependent on
the principle of autonomy.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES
Now that something is known about the situation with which
we are dealing, the important question remaining is how to
do the job efficiently. At Goddard, we have built our strat
egies around certain unifying principles which, in themselves,
will foster management efficiency and optimal use of Spacelab systems. Furthermore, it is our belief that these prin
ciples are well-suited to the operational environment of the
future discussed in the preceding text. A brief description of
these principles follows:
A. Production Line Similarities-Spacelab's potentially
large volume operations, together with the idea of a standard
spacecraft with standard interfaces, is somewhat analogous
to an assembly or production line. For example, both payload development and integration activities contain a finite
number of functions which are performed over and over
again for each instrument and for each mission. This analogy
applies equally well to "soft" systems such as project man

Each of the above strategies permits more authority and
responsibility to be delegated; as a result, greater independ
ence from other elements in the system is achieved.
C. Flexibility-ln the Spacelab program, we are estab
lishing ground processing and flight systems which are able
to support a large number of users on each individual flight,
and whose specific requirements for each particular mission
are presently unknown. To further complicate matters,
Spacelab will handle a wide-ranging and varied assortment of
missions. Therefore, we have been proponents of ground and
flight systems that have the flexibility of satisfying a full
range of future, as yet undetermined, but someday, very
specific mission requirements.
Such a system, if it is to remain relatively low in cost and
free of complication, must be managed and controlled.
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Criteria must be established for determining, in advance,
how the more critical and costly resources such as on-board
crew use, Spacelab computer capacity, and Payload Oper
ations Control Center (POCC) support will be allocated
among users. These criteria must be applied in an evenhanded fashion, and, together with information and other
STS services, provided so as to promote maximum Spacelab
utility.
D. Knowledge—The creation of a Spacelab mission
involves many highly specialized talents and skills residing in
universities, government and industry. If the system for
planning and executing Spacelab missions is to be efficient
and effective, then the utilization of these valuable resources
will have to be optimized. Spacelab management should
avoid replicating effort which has already been expended
at earlier stages in the process. We should also assure the
most effective application of the backgrounds and expe
riences of participating organizations.
At Goddard, we have attempted to apply this principle in
several ways. To minimize the costly and sometime ineffec
tive formal transfer of information from the Principal In
vestigator (PI) to the government and contractor, the know
ledge and capabilities possessed by the PI and his team will
be used when and where it is sensible to do so. Likewise,
assigning payload integration responsibility to industry,
which has considerable experience in this area, (considerably
more than the government when the production aspect is
taken into account) seems appropriate. Moreover, why do
any more than specify requirements in a Request for Pro
posal (RFP), since the bidder should know how to most
efficently and effectively apply his resources? Government
manpower can be reserved for other critical functions such
as the development and management of activities having
greater technological uncertainty.

E. Risk Management-Bringing the STS, Spacelab and
their capabilities into reality will require technical and man
agement innovations. Innovation, which usually implies
rewards, is also another way of implying risks. However,
when the potential rewards are sufficiently large, tradition
must make way for new ideas and approaches. The Project,
in consideration of the repeating nature of the Spacelab
payload processes, plans to moderate risk in this area by
utilizing existing techniques when they are cost effective, by
experimenting with new techniques where innovation seems
most likely to pay off, and once proven, by widely dissem
inating these new techniques to users.
Naturally, risks will also result from the basic immaturity
of the Spacelab and the STS. At Goddard, in recognition of
the Spacelab's immaturity, we hope to lower this element of
risk by keeping our early missions simple and uncomplicated,
evolving to the more complex after gaining experience and
refining our processes. Also, for the more complex under
takings, we consistently ask the question: Is an evolutionary
strategy in order?
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Of course, there are other risks, including those associated
with the overall management approach used by NASA. How
ever, after more than 20 years of far reaching space activities,
NASA and industry should have the experience to intel
ligently manage risk.

CONCLUSION
Much effort is needed before the STS promise, as envisioned
by its creators, becomes reality. First, we must continue to
take bold steps in formulating imaginative and compelling
Spacelab uses which effectively exploit the potential capabil
ities of the system. Second, we must break with those tra
ditions whose time has passed, and which would therefore
preclude Spacelab integration from becoming a simple,
smoothly flowing, efficient process. Third, we must make
optimal use of the capabilities which exist in NASA, the
research communities, and private industry.
Finally, probably more important than anything, we must
have both vision and commitment. A vision of what is
ideally desirable and really necessary for successful Spacelab/STS operations, and a commitment to achieving that
part of the vision which is practical and beneficial to our
national space objectives.

